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INTRODUCTION
Federal employment discrimination law is enamored with
court-created doctrines with catchy names.1 A fairly recent addition
to the canon is the concept of the “cat’s paw,” formally recognized
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Staub v. Proctor Hospital.2 With its
name coined by Judge Richard Posner and drawn from a fable, the
concept of cat’s paw has taken ground quickly, discussed in
hundreds of cases.3
The Supreme Court recognized the cat’s paw theory in a case
where a hospital fired a worker. The person who made the ultimate
decision did not have impermissible bias. However, her decision
was influenced by information from two supervisors who arguably
did possess such bias.4 The Court held that “if a supervisor
performs an act motivated by [impermissible] animus that
is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment
action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate
employment action, then the employer is liable.”5 Since then, courts
have applied cat’s paw analysis under a wide range of federal
statutes including Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
and others.6
This Article argues that the cat’s paw doctrine is a mistake, and
the courts should abolish it. Before the Supreme Court recognized
it as a separate doctrine, the Court decided numerous cases with
facts that could now be called cat’s paw cases. The Supreme Court
did not need or even mention the need for a new doctrine to
1. See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728
(2011) (explaining similarly situated comparators); Natasha T. Martin, Pretext in Peril,
75 MO. L. REV. 313, 347, 357 (2010) (discussing multiple sub-doctrines); Kerri Lynn
Stone, Taking in Strays: A Critique of the Stray Comment Doctrine in Employment Discrimination
Law, 77 MO. L. REV. 149, 180 (2012) (discussing stray remarks doctrine).
2. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411 (2011).
3. See, e.g., Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 400 (7th Cir. 1990).
4. Staub, 562 U.S. at 413–15, 422. By describing the facts of this case, I am not
suggesting that a person is required to act with animus or intent to create liability under
federal discrimination law.
5. Id. at 422 (footnote omitted).
6. See, e.g., Acosta v. Brain, 910 F.3d 502, 514 (9th Cir. 2018) (applying cat’s paw in
ERISA retaliation context); Perkins v. Child Care Assocs., 751 F. App’x 469, 475 (5th Cir. 2018)
(applying cat’s paw to the FMLA); Chattman v. Toho Tenax Am., Inc., 686 F.3d 339, 351
(6th Cir. 2012) (Title VII); Simmons v. Sykes Enters., Inc., 647 F.3d 943, 949 (10th Cir. 2011)
(discussing cat’s paw in context of ADEA).
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adjudicate those cases. Strangely, the Supreme Court does not cite
any of these cases in Staub.
Indeed, these Supreme Court cases are going to cause a judicial
headache as lower courts try to reconcile pre-Staub jurisprudence
with the court-created cat’s paw doctrine. The current cat’s paw
doctrine muddles rather than elucidates complex concepts of
intent, causation, and agency liability.
Before cat’s paw doctrine becomes further entrenched, this
Article provides a new and more complete history of the doctrine.
This new history shows that courts did not need the cat’s paw
doctrine prior to its creation. They were resolving cases that
presented cat’s paw scenarios without any resort to the complicated
analytical structure that now accompanies the doctrine. Even the
Seventh Circuit decision that coined the phrase “cat’s paw” did not
rely on cat’s paw to resolve the case.7
Importantly, there is only one way to reconcile Staub with
several other canonical Supreme Court cases—to read it as simply
recognizing one set of facts under which a plaintiff could prevail
under federal discrimination law. Some lower courts are
interpreting Staub to place significant limits on the scope of
discrimination law.8 However, using cat’s paw to limit the scope is
inconsistent with numerous Supreme Court cases as well as the text
and purposes of the discrimination statutes.
Cat’s paw doctrine should be abolished while it is in its infancy
because it is not needed and will likely lead to decades of confusion
in employment discrimination jurisprudence. As it is unlikely that
the Supreme Court will admit that Staub’s complicated holding was
a mistake, I also suggest ways that the courts can retain the core of
Staub while jettisoning its more problematic features.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the Staub case
in-depth, covering its journey from the trial court to the Supreme
Court. Part II discusses several Supreme Court cases decided both
prior to and after Staub that fall within the ambit of what would
now be called cat’s paw. It demonstrates that the Supreme Court
did not need a special cat’s paw doctrine to resolve these cases. Part
III explores the Seventh Circuit decision in Shager v. Upjohn Co.,
7. Shager, 913 F.2d at 400.
8. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Empress Ambulance Serv., Inc., 835 F.3d 267, 275 (2d Cir.

2016); Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 659 (5th Cir. 2012).
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showing that even that court did not rely on cat’s paw doctrine. Part
IV contrasts the Supreme Court cases and Shager with Staub,
showing that it will be difficult to reconcile a restrictive cat’s paw
doctrine with them. Part V highlights the problems federal courts
are experiencing with cat’s paw and charts a path forward based on
the text and purposes of the federal discrimination statutes.
I. THE CAT’S PAW
The Supreme Court recognized the cat’s paw theory in Staub v.
Proctor Hospital.9 Since Staub, there has been surprisingly little
scholarly attention paid to cat’s paw doctrine.10 This Part provides
an overview of the case as it made its way through the courts,
focusing on the important doctrinal and theoretical issues
presented at each stage.
A. Staub at the Trial Court
Vincent Staub sued his employer for terminating his
employment, alleging the employer violated the Uniformed
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA).11
USERRA prohibits employers from discriminating or retaliating
against service members based on their military service.12 Staub
worked as an angio technician at a hospital. He was also a member
of the Army Reserve. As an army reservist, Staub would miss work

9. Staub, 562 U.S. 411.
10. L. Camille Hébert, The Supreme Court’s 2010–2011 Labor and Employment Law

Decisions: A Large and “Mixed Bag” for Employers and Employees, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J.
279, 293 (2011); Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. REV.
1431, 1432–34 (2012). Some articles briefly discuss cat’s paw theory. Matthew T. Bodie,
The Roberts Court and the Law of Human Resources, 34 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 159, 183 (2013);
Dallan F. Flake, When Should Employers Be Liable for Factoring Biased Customer Feedback into
Employment Decisions?, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2169, 2202 (2018) (considering whether cat’s paw
could be used to hold employers liable for using discriminatory customer feedback); Richard
Thompson Ford, Bias in the Air: Rethinking Employment Discrimination Law, 66 STAN. L. REV.
1381, 1413–14 (2014) (briefly noting the causal questions cat’s paw theory invites); see also
Stephen F. Befort & Alison L. Olig, Within the Grasp of the Cat’s Paw: Delineating the Scope of
Subordinate Bias Liability Under Federal Antidiscrimination Statutes, 60 S.C. L. REV. 383,
389–97 (2008) (discussing the competing standards established by the circuit courts of
appeals prior to Staub).
11. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 560 F.3d 647, 650–51 (7th Cir. 2009), rev’d and remanded, 562
U.S. 411 (2011). This section recounts the facts as described by the courts. The employer
contested many of the facts and the inferences to be drawn from them.
12. 38 U.S.C. § 4311 (2018).
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for training and deployments, often on the weekends. After
working for the hospital for fourteen years, the hospital terminated
his employment. Staub filed suit, arguing that the hospital
provided false reasons for firing him and that the real reason was
animosity toward his military service.
Staub presented evidence that in 2000, Janice Mulally (who the
court described as second-in-command of the imaging department)
began to prepare work schedules for the imaging department
where Staub worked.13 Staub informed Mulally of his Army
Reserve duties, which required him to attend training one weekend
a month and for two weeks during the summer. Before Mulally
took over scheduling, Staub did not work on the weekends;
however, Mulally scheduled Staub for weekend work knowing
about his Reserve duties.14 At times, Mulally would change the
schedule to accommodate Staub’s military obligations when he
reminded her about his drill requirements. However, sometimes
she would tell Staub’s co-workers that volunteers were needed
to cover his weekend shift. Occasionally, she required Staub to use
vacation days to cover weekend shift time when he was at Reserve
training, and she scheduled him for extra shifts without notice.
Mulally “called Staub’s military duties ‘bullshit’ and said the extra
shifts were his ‘way of paying back the department for everyone
else having to bend over backwards to cover [his] schedule for
the Reserves.’”15
The department head for Staub’s unit was Michael Korenchuk,
who sometimes intervened on the scheduling issues, but never
finally resolved them. According to the appellate court,
“Korenchuk characterized drill weekends as ‘Army Reserve
bullshit’ and ‘a b[u]nch of smoking and joking and [a] waste of
taxpayers[’] money.’”16
A co-worker, Amy Knoerle, reported that “Mulally would roll
her eyes and make sighing noises” when Staub would approach her
about his drill obligations.17 A new employee, Leslie Sweborg,
joined the unit. She testified that two weeks into the job she met

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Staub, 560 F.3d at 651.
Id.
Id. at 652.
Id.
Id.
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Mulally and another coworker (Angie Day) for drinks after work.
Sweborg testified that Mulally told her Staub’s “military duty had
been a strain on the[ ] department” and “she did not like him as an
employee.” Mulally asked Sweborg “to help her get rid of him.”18
Sweborg refused.
In January of 2004, Staub received a notice that he needed to
report for duty as a precursor to an active deployment. Korenchuk
became concerned about work coverage because, at that time,
Sweborg and Staub were the only angio techs. In late January,
Mulally gave both Sweborg and Staub written warnings for failure
to help another diagnostic unit when requested. Sweborg and
Staub both disputed the facts upon which Mulally relied to issue
the warning, and Staub also disputed whether the two violated any
work rule.19 As part of the warning, Staub was required to report to
Korenchuk or Mulally when he did not have any patients and to
remain in the general diagnostic area unless Korenchuk or Mulally
gave him permission to go elsewhere.20
According to the facts as stated by the appellate court, Staub’s
problems got worse in April of 2004. The court noted:
On April 2, 2004, Day had a meeting with Korenchuk, Linda Buck
(vice-president of Human Resources), and R. Garrett McGowan
(chief operating officer). Day was upset with Korenchuk because
she complained to him about Staub and he did nothing in
response. Day said she had difficulty working with Staub, he
would “absent himself from the department,” and he tended to be
“abrupt.” After Day left the room, Korenchuk, Buck, and
McGowan discussed what they should do. This wasn’t the first
time McGowan had heard about “availability” problems
involving Staub, so he told Korenchuk to work with Buck to create
a plan that would solve the issue. They never found time to do
that—Staub ran into trouble again and was fired three weeks later
on April 20.21

The trouble on April 20 began when Sweborg and Staub wanted
to go to lunch. They could not find Korenchuk, so they left a
voicemail for him letting him know they were going to lunch.

18.
19.
20.
21.

1224
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Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 414 (2011).
Staub, 560 F.3d at 653.
Id. at 653–54.
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When they returned thirty minutes later, Korenchuk demanded to
know where they had been. Even though they explained that they
were at lunch and explained they left a voicemail message,
Korenchuk took Staub to the Human Resources office, where Buck
told him he was fired.
A written report indicated that the hospital fired Staub because
he failed to comply with the conditions of the written warning.
Buck made the decision to fire Staub with Korenchuk’s input.
According to the appellate court, “Without the January 27 write-up,
Day’s April 2 complaint, and the event on April 20—all of which
involved unavailability or ‘disappearances’—Buck said she would
not have fired Staub.”22 Buck also based her decision on past issues
regarding Staub of which she was aware. She reviewed his
personnel file before making her decision. She was not aware of
potential animus by Day or Mulally related to Staub’s military
service. Staub grieved his termination and raised the issue of
potential military animus. Buck did not investigate this claim and
reaffirmed her decision to terminate Staub’s employment.23
The trial court judge denied the employer’s motion for
summary judgment and allowed the case to go to trial. A jury heard
Staub’s case and awarded him $57,640.00 in damages.24
The employer filed post-trial motions, which the trial court
denied. In considering these motions, the trial court noted that “the
testimony and documentation about who said what to whom was
hotly contested.”25 It emphasized that credibility determinations
belong to a jury and that once a witness provides unreliable
evidence, the factfinder is allowed to disbelieve other evidence
proffered by that witness.26 The trial court judge allowed the jury
to determine whether the defendant’s investigation was sufficient
to break the causal chain for liability.27

22. Id. at 654.
23. Id. at 655.
24. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., No. 04-1219, 2008 WL 2001935, at *1 (C.D. Ill. May 7,

2008), rev’d in part, 560 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2009), rev’d and remanded, 562 U.S. 411 (2011). The
trial in Staub was delayed while the appellate courts were considering issues related to cat’s
paw in contemporaneous cases. Joint Appendix at 89a–90a, Staub, 562 U.S. 411 (No. 09-400),
2010 WL 2707600.
25. Staub, 2008 WL 2001935, at *2.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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The trial court noted that the employer raised a new cat’s paw
issue in post-trial motions, pointing to a Seventh Circuit cat’s paw
case decided after the trial in Staub—Metzger v. Illinois State Police.28
In Metzger, the Seventh Circuit considered a case in which a board
made the final decision regarding whether to increase the pay
grade of an employee’s position.29 The worker alleged that a
supervisor who provided the board with information about the
employee’s work responsibilities conveyed inaccurate information
to the board because of a retaliatory motive.30
Without any reference to Title VII, the Seventh Circuit relied on
its prior cases and held that the worker could not prevail. The
Seventh Circuit’s holding in Metzger is a little unclear as it appears
to rest on two grounds. The Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff
could not prevail because the board was not wholly dependent on
the allegedly biased supervisor’s information.31 However, the court
also noted that there was no evidence that the supervisor’s
comments influenced the board at all.32
The distinction between the two possible holdings is important
because it would later affect the appellate court outcome in Staub.
One way to read the Metzger case is that it required the plaintiff in
a cat’s paw case to show that the biased individual had a singular
influence on the person or body who made the decision. As
discussed in more detail throughout this Article, such a standard is
not based on the text of the employment discrimination statutes
and requires the plaintiff to prove too tight a connection between a
protected class or protected activity and an outcome. However, the
second possible holding is more consistent with Title VII. Title VII
requires a plaintiff to establish that a protected trait was a
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other
factors also motivated the practice.33 In retaliation cases, a plaintiff
must establish that protected conduct was a “but for” cause of the
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at *1.
Metzger v. Ill. State Police, 519 F.3d 677, 682 (7th Cir. 2008).
Id.
Id. at 682 (“[W]here a decision maker is not wholly dependent on a single source
of information, but instead conducts its own investigation into the facts relevant to the
decision, the employer is not liable for an employee’s submission of misinformation to
the decision maker.” (quoting Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 918
(7th Cir. 2007))).
32. Id.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2018).
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outcome.34 If a plaintiff cannot show how her protected trait or
protected activity influenced the outcome at all, then the plaintiff
has failed to show causation.
The trial court in Staub found that Metzger did not alter the
Seventh Circuit’s prior cat’s paw jurisprudence.35 In Staub, the trial
court judge instructed the jury using both of the standards
discussed in Metzger. The verdict form asked the jury whether
Staub proved by a preponderance of the evidence that his military
status was a motivating factor in his discharge.36 However, the jury
also received a singular influence cat’s paw instruction.37 The judge
instructed the jury that the “[a]nimosity of a co-worker toward the
Plaintiff on the basis of Plaintiff’s military status as a motivating
factor may not be attributed to Defendant unless that co-worker
exercised such singular influence over the decision maker that the
co-worker was basically the real decision maker.”38
In ruling on the post-trial motions in Staub, the trial judge
appeared to be focused on two important issues: the procedural
posture of the case and the contested nature of the facts. The trial
judge was unsure who did what, when they did it, and how what
they did ultimately impacted the outcome. The trial court judge
denied the employer’s post-trial motions.
B. Staub at the Seventh Circuit
The appeal centered on cat’s paw liability. The employer
argued that the trial court judge gave improper instructions to the
jury and improperly admitted evidence related to animus of nondecisionmakers.39 After recounting the facts of the case in the light
most favorable to the verdict, the Seventh Circuit began framing
the legal dispute before it. Without any citation, the appellate court
first noted, “a plaintiff suing under USERRA does not win by
showing prohibited animus by just anyone. He must show that

34. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 343 (2013).
35. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., No. 04-1219, 2008 WL 2001935, at *2 (C.D. Ill. May 7,

2008), rev’d in part, 560 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2009), rev’d and remanded, 562 U.S. 411 (2011).
36. Joint Appendix, supra note 24, at 68a.
37. Id. at 71a.
38. Id.
39. Staub, 560 F.3d at 651.
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the decisionmaker harbored animus and relied on that animus in
choosing to take action.”40
As discussed in more detail below, this framing is incorrect
because it focuses on the animus of a particular decisionmaker or
decisionmakers, rather than the causal factors that led to an
outcome. Under employment discrimination law, decisions to take
employment actions (like hiring, firing, or promoting individuals)
are the employer’s action. Employers as entities do not have animus
in the same way that a person could. Even if we can say that an
individual employee or group of employees made the decision, the
action is situated at the employer or entity level. An individual
decisionmaker has no ability to fire an employee because the
employee is not employed by the decisionmaker; he is employed
by the entity. Thus, the causal connection is between the protected
status and the outcome, and not the animus of any particular
decisionmaker to an outcome.
One way to prove that a decision is discriminatory is to
show that the person who made it had a discriminatory animus,
but this is not the only way. As discussed throughout this
Article, there is an entire body of law describing different ways to
show that a decision was taken because of a protected trait (or in
Staub’s case, because of his military service). The appellate court
analysis got off on the wrong foot by misstating basic employment
discrimination law.
After this introduction, the court then explored whether Staub
could prevail under a cat’s paw theory. In framing the issue, the
appellate court again made the same mistake about animus and the
decisionmaker. It noted, “Deploying the cat’s paw theory, Staub
sought to attribute Mulally’s animus to Buck, and therefore to
Proctor [the hospital].”41 When an employer takes a tangible
employment action, employment discrimination law does not
require the animus of a person to be attributed to the employer (the
legal entity). Rather, the question is whether the plaintiff’s
protected status caused the outcome.
At the beginning of its opinion, the appellate court noted:

40. Id. at 655.
41. Id.

1228
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One would guess that the chances are pretty slim that the work
of a 17th century French poet would find its way into a Chicago
courtroom in 2009. But that’s the situation in this case as we try to
make sense out of what has been dubbed the “cat’s paw” theory.
The term derives from the fable “The Monkey and the Cat”
penned by Jean de La Fontaine (1621–1695). In the tale, a clever—
and rather unscrupulous—monkey persuades an unsuspecting
feline to snatch chestnuts from a fire. The cat burns her paw in the
process while the monkey profits, gulping down the chestnuts
one by one. As understood today, a cat’s paw is a “tool” or “one
used by another to accomplish his purposes.”42

Later in the opinion, the court recited its cat’s paw standard,
which required that the biased subordinate have a singular
influence over the decisionmaker.43 If the decisionmaker did not
just rely on the information provided by the subordinate, but
conducted her own investigation and analysis, there could be no
cat’s paw liability in the Seventh Circuit.44
Although admitting that the trial court gave jury instructions
that properly instructed the jury about the singular influence
standard, the appellate court found that the trial court improperly
introduced evidence of Mulally’s bias. The appellate court believed
the trial court should have excluded this evidence by finding as a
matter of law that no reasonable juror could find that Mulally
exercised this singular influence.45 The appellate court did not grant
a new trial, but rather took the extraordinary step of granting
judgment in favor of the employer.
This holding is problematic on a number of fronts. First, given
the jury’s verdict and the instruction given, the jury did factually
find that the military animus singularly influenced the
decisionmaker. It is unclear why the appellate court believed it
should second-guess this factual finding by declaring that no
reasonable jury could so find. A reasonable jury did so find—the
actual jury impaneled in this case. Further, the trial court judge
believed that a jury could so find, because the trial judge allowed
the case to go to trial and denied post-trial motions.
42. Id. at 650.
43. Id. at 656.
44. It is worth noting that there is no reference to any statutory language in the

Seventh Circuit’s description of cat’s paw doctrine.
45. Staub, 560 F.3d at 658.
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Second, the Seventh Circuit focused on the connection between
Mulally and Buck. It ignored that the correct connection is between
the protected trait and the outcome, thus diminishing the evidence
presented by the plaintiff. By focusing on the “decisionmaker,”
rather than the outcome, the appellate court appears to exclude
the evidence that Korenchuk also exhibited bias, and that Mulally
may have induced Day to make the original complaint that started
the process. Indeed, when the case went to the Supreme Court, the
Supreme Court provided additional facts about Korenchuk that are
not contained with the appellate court’s set of facts: “that
Korenchuk made negative remarks about Staub’s Reserve duties
before firing him in 1998,” “that Korenchuk informed Staub of
the revenue lost while he was on Active Duty in 2003,”
“that Korenchuk was aware in January 2004 that Staub might be
called to Active Duty again, and that ‘[b]udget was a big issue
with [Korenchuk].’”46
Third, the Seventh Circuit then continued by spinning a version
of the facts that clearly drew inferences in favor of the employer
and not the plaintiff. For example, the court discussed Staub’s
alleged history of employment problems, even though the court
failed to discuss why, if Staub was such a terrible employee, he
remained employed at the hospital for fourteen years.47 The court
noted that one of Staub’s recent performance reviews rated his
performance as nearly perfect.48 The court strangely concluded that
this prior history justified the discharge even without the more
recent performance issues. Again, this claim is contrary to the jury
verdict and also to the fact that Staub was a long-term employee.
The court then also found that even though Buck’s investigation
could have been more “robust,” it was sufficient.49
The court then invoked the cat’s paw fable. The court used ideas
from the fable to find that the decisionmaker’s reliance must be
“blind reliance.”50 It is strange indeed that a court would decide a
case based on reference to a fable, rather than by reference to the
applicable statute.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

1230
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Staub, 560 F.3d at 659.
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C. Staub at the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Staub to resolve a
circuit split regarding the proper standard in cat’s paw cases.51
The Supreme Court upheld the use of cat’s paw doctrine and
enunciated a test to apply in some circumstances. Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion in which five other Justices joined. Justice
Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, which
was joined by Justice Thomas. Justice Kagan did not participate in
the opinion.
After reciting the facts, the Supreme Court provided the text of
USERRA and noted that it is similar to Title VII.52 The Court’s
analysis began with the statement: “[W]e start from the premise
that when Congress creates a federal tort it adopts the background
of general tort law.”53 The Court then applied a tort law overlay
to USERRA.
The Court stated that intent requires a person to intend
the consequences of his actions or believe that consequences are
substantially certain to occur.54 It noted that even if Mulally and
Korenchuk acted with discriminatory animus, they did
not terminate Staub. Instead, they reported performance
deficiencies. Staub presented evidence that he had not violated any
workplace rules and that the reporting was motivated by his
military obligations.
Because reporting performance problems does not itself violate
USERRA, no liability attached for the making of those reports. The
Court assumed that submitting a negative performance review is

51. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, Staub, 562 U.S. 411 (No.
09-400), 2010 WL 3611711, at *9; Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Following Lower-Court Precedent,
81 U. CHI. L. REV. 851, 927 (2014).
52. Staub, 562 U.S. at 417. USERRA provides: “An employer shall be considered to
have engaged in actions prohibited . . . under subsection (a), if the person’s membership . . .
in the uniformed services is a motivating factor in the employer’s action, unless the employer
can prove that the action would have been taken in the absence of such membership . . . .”
38 U.S.C. § 4311(c)(1) (2018). Title VII prohibits employment discrimination “because of . . .
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” and states that such discrimination is established
when one of those factors “was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even
though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a), (m) (2018).
53. Staub, 562 U.S. at 417; see also Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, the Common
Law, and Proximate Cause, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 [hereinafter Sperino, Discrimination Statutes];
Sandra F. Sperino, The Tort Label, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1051 (2014).
54. Staub, 562 U.S. at 422 n.3.
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not cognizable on its own under USERRA. In discrimination
jurisprudence, there is a continuing circuit split about this issue.55
The Court continued by deciding whether the hospital could be
held liable for the animus and actions of the two subordinate
supervisors. It stated: “Perhaps, therefore, the discriminatory
motive of one of the employer’s agents (Mulally or Korenchuk) can
be aggregated with the act of another agent (Buck) to impose
liability on Proctor.”56 The Court discussed various views of agency
law and then somehow resolved the agency issue through
causation. The Court stated:
Ultimately, we think it unnecessary in this case to decide what the
background rule of agency law may be, since the former line of
authority is suggested by the governing text, which requires that
discrimination be “a motivating factor” in the adverse action. When
a decision to fire is made with no unlawful animus on the part of
the firing agent, but partly on the basis of a report prompted
(unbeknownst to that agent) by discrimination, discrimination
might perhaps be called a “factor” or a “causal factor” in the
decision; but it seems to us a considerable stretch to call it “a
motivating factor.”57

The lower courts are still struggling with questions about
whether cat’s paw doctrine is about causation, agency, or both
causation and agency. The Supreme Court rejected the standard
suggested by the employer, that the employer is only liable if the
decisionmaker possessed discriminatory animus.58
As discussed below, another conceptual problem in cat’s paw
jurisprudence is the effect of a subsequent decision or a subsequent
investigation by a non-biased supervisor prior to making an
employment decision. The Court distinguished independent
judgment from a subsequent investigation. It specifically held that
the independent judgment of a decisionmaker does not break the

55. See, e.g., Taylor v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 11-CV-3582, 2012 WL 5989874, at *7
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2012) (being rated as having unsatisfactory performance not sufficient to
constitute an adverse action); Hill v. Rayboy-Brauestein, 467 F. Supp. 2d 336, 351 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (noting that a negative evaluation can be an adverse action if it leads to a material
adverse change in work conditions).
56. Staub, 562 U.S. at 418.
57. Id. at 418–19.
58. Id. at 419.
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causal chain. The Court purported to address this problem through
proximate cause jurisprudence. The Court noted:
And it is axiomatic under tort law that the exercise of judgment
by the decisionmaker does not prevent the earlier agent’s action
(and hence the earlier agent’s discriminatory animus) from being
the proximate cause of the harm. Proximate cause requires only
“some direct relation between the injury asserted and the
injurious conduct alleged,” and excludes only those “link[s] that
[are] too remote, purely contingent, or indirect.” Hemi Group, LLC
v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 9 (2010) (internal quotation marks
and brackets omitted). We do not think that the ultimate
decisionmaker’s exercise of judgment automatically renders the
link to the supervisor’s bias “remote” or “purely contingent.”59

The Court continued by noting that the decisionmaker’s
judgment is a proximate cause of the decision, but provided that
the common law allows for multiple proximate causes.60 It also
indicated that the judgment is not a superseding cause because
superseding cause only exists if it is a “cause of independent origin
that was not foreseeable.”61
The Court also rejected the idea that the independent judgment
breaks the causal chain for practical and fairness reasons.
The Court reasoned:
Proctor’s view would have the improbable consequence that if an
employer isolates a personnel official from an employee’s
supervisors, vests the decision to take adverse employment
actions in that official, and asks that official to review the
employee’s personnel file before taking the adverse action, then
the employer will be effectively shielded from discriminatory acts
and recommendations of supervisors that were designed and
intended to produce the adverse action. That seems to us an
implausible meaning of the text, and one that is not compelled by
its words.62

The Court held that the mere fact that an investigation occurred
did not relieve the employer of liability. “The employer is at fault
because one of its agents committed an action based on

59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. at 420.
Id. (citing Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 837 (1996)).
Id.
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discriminatory animus that was intended to cause, and did in fact
cause, an adverse employment decision.”63 The Court also noted:
“Since a supervisor is an agent of the employer, when he causes an
adverse employment action the employer causes it; and when
discrimination is a motivating factor in his doing so, it is a
‘motivating factor in the employer’s action,’ precisely as the
text requires.”64
However, the Court also recognized that an investigation might
break the causal chain, in very limited circumstances. It held that
the employer’s investigation must be “unrelated to the supervisor’s
original biased action.”65 The Court also noted that under USERRA,
the defendant would be required to prove the causal break.66
However, the biased report remains a factor “if the independent
investigation takes it into account without determining that the
adverse action was, apart from the supervisor’s recommendation,
entirely justified.”67 Some of the Court’s discussion regarding
investigations is dicta, and it is not entirely clear how lower courts
should determine when an employer investigation breaks the
causal chain and when it does not.
The Court ultimately held: “if a supervisor performs an act
motivated by antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor
to cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is a
proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then the
employer is liable under USERRA.”68 Turning to the facts of the
Staub case, the Court held that the facts presented could meet the
new standard. However, because the jury was not instructed with
this standard, the Court remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit
to determine whether the jury’s verdict should be reinstated or
whether a new trial should be granted.
The Court explicitly noted that it was not deciding a number of
questions related to cat’s paw. It did not decide what should
happen if the subordinate supervisor intended one outcome, but a
different outcome resulted from a process the subordinate

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

1234

Id. at 421.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 422 (footnote omitted).
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supervisor started in motion.69 It also did not decide whether
liability would occur if a co-worker (rather than a supervisor)
possessed the required bias.70
As discussed throughout this Article, there are many
unanswered questions after Staub, many of which relate to how
restrictive the cat’s paw doctrine is in limiting claims. One way to
interpret Staub is that it merely stated one set of facts under which
a plaintiff could prevail and that it did not intend to significantly
limit plaintiffs’ claims. However, it is also possible to interpret
Staub robustly to limit the circumstances under which a plaintiff
could prevail. For example, Staub might be interpreted to limit cat’s
paw liability to the acts of supervisors or to require the biased actor
to intend the action that eventually occurs. Under this second
approach, Staub creates more questions than it answers.
II. PRE-STAUB LANDSCAPE
One preliminary question worth answering is whether
employment discrimination jurisprudence needs a cat’s paw
doctrine at all. Several canonical Supreme Court employment
discrimination cases were decided on facts that could now be
characterized as cat’s paw cases, but which were not so
characterized at the time. The courts were able to resolve these
cases without any reference to cat’s paw.
Strangely, the Supreme Court did not cite any of these cases in
Staub. Importantly, the outcomes in these cases are inconsistent
with Staub, if Staub is interpreted to significantly limit the evidence
plaintiffs can submit to establish liability.
By looking at these cases collectively, several themes emerge.
First, there are many Supreme Court cases in which multiple
people interacted in a process that resulted in an employment
action against the plaintiff. Pre-Staub, the Supreme Court was
often unconcerned about who “made” the final decision and
about specifically tracing a biased individual’s influence to a
final decisionmaker.

69. Id. at 419 n.2. This footnote is especially confusing because it uses the concept of
intent, but the footnote references a portion of the Restatement (Second) of Torts relating to
negligence law.
70. Id. at 422 n.4.
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Rather, the Court was concerned with whether the outcome the
employer allowed to happen was caused or impacted by a
protected class. Although the plaintiff may show this by
establishing that the person who made the decision was biased, the
statutes do not require the plaintiff to show that the protected class
motivated the decisionmaker. This is an important distinction in
some cases. It is the outcome that needs to be connected to the
protected trait.
Second, the pre-Staub cases do not depend upon proof that a
particular person intended an adverse action. Indeed, many of the
cases do not even describe facts that would allow a reader to
determine what action the allegedly biased individual intended.
Third, many of the pre-Staub cases do not rely on the status of
the allegedly biased individual to determine employer liability.
And, the Supreme Court does not always identify the people
involved in the decision or the power that they have to effectuate
decisions.71 The Supreme Court does not use an agency analysis to
assign liability to the employer. Rather, the employer has liability
because it took an employment action.
Finally, the Court does not frame its analysis in the terms of
proximate cause, even when the facts span multiple years and
multiple people and when it is unclear exactly how all of the
comments and actions impact the contested outcome.
As lower courts try to use cat’s paw doctrine after Staub, they
will constantly be confronted with how to differentiate or integrate
cat’s paw scenarios with these prior cases. As discussed in Part IV,
these pre-Staub cases cannot be reconciled with a restrictive version
of Staub because Staub reframed issues of bias, motive, cause-infact, proximate cause, and agency law in ways that are not
consistent with either the text of the federal discrimination statutes
or the Supreme Court’s prior interpretations of those concepts.
The cases discussed below show that the courts did not need an
elaborate cat’s paw analysis and instead prior to Staub used an
approach that considered whether the plaintiff’s evidence taken as
a whole demonstrated that a protected trait was connected to the
negative outcome.

71. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 233 (1989). The Court refers to people
who submitted the evaluations as partners.
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Importantly, this line of cases demonstrates that plaintiffs are
not required to proceed under a cat’s paw analysis to prove their
claims. They may proceed under any available analytical structure.
A. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court considered
whether an accountant could bring a sex discrimination claim when
her firm did not promote her to partner.72 The Supreme Court
described the very lengthy partnership decision-making process
used by the accounting firm. It allowed partners at the firm to
submit written comments about partner candidates.73 The
Admissions Committee would then make a recommendation to the
Policy Board to accept the candidate as a partner, put the
application on hold, or deny partnership.74 The Policy Board then
decided “whether to submit the candidate’s name to the entire
partnership for a vote, to ‘hold’ her candidacy, or to reject her.”75
The Supreme Court recounted generally how partners have
voted related to Hopkins: “Thirteen of the 32 partners who had
submitted comments on Hopkins supported her bid for
partnership. Three partners recommended that her candidacy be
placed on hold, eight stated that they did not have an informed
opinion about her, and eight recommended that she be
denied partnership.”76
Multiple partners praised her performance on large projects.77
Some criticized her for being brusque with staff members.78 The
Supreme Court recounted the now-famous comments about Ms.
Hopkins submitted by some of the partners.
One partner described her as “macho”; another suggested that she
“overcompensated for being a woman”; a third advised her to
take “a course at charm school.” Several partners criticized her
use of profanity; in response, one partner suggested that those
partners objected to her swearing only “because it’s a lady using
foul language.” Another supporter explained that Hopkins “ha[d]
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 232.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 233.
Id.
Id.
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matured from a tough-talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed
mgr to an authoritative, formidable, but much more appealing
lady ptr candidate.” But it was the man who, as [the district judge]
found, bore responsibility for explaining to Hopkins the reasons
for the Policy Board’s decision to place her candidacy on hold who
delivered the coup de grace: in order to improve her chances for
partnership, Thomas Beyer advised, Hopkins should “walk more
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear
make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”79

The Supreme Court held that a plaintiff can prevail on a sex
discrimination case if she can show that her gender was the
motivating factor for an outcome.80 The Supreme Court did not
appear to focus on agency issues, but viewed liability as the
employer’s direct liability.81
The Court focused on whether the outcome was influenced by
sex-based considerations.82 The Supreme Court noted: “a person’s
gender may not be considered in making decisions that affect her.
Indeed, Title VII even forbids employers to make gender an indirect
stumbling block to employment opportunities.”83 The Court also
noted that an employer is liable under Title VII when it allows
“gender to affect its decision-making process.”84 The Court also
specifically stated that it was not limiting the ways that the plaintiff
could prove her sex played a role in the employer’s decision.85
There are several features of Price Waterhouse that are important
to our cat’s paw discussion. First, the Supreme Court did not even
identify who “made” the final decision, other than a “policy
board.”86 Nor did the Court specifically trace a biased individual’s
influence to that final decisionmaker. It did not discuss the votes of
the individual members of the policy board or what information
each reviewed.

79. Id. at 235 (citations omitted).
80. Id. at 240–41. The main opinion in Price Waterhouse is a plurality; however, some

portions of the plurality analysis constitute a majority when combined with one or both of
the concurring opinions.
81. See id. at 241–42.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 242.
84. Id. at 248.
85. Id. at 251–52.
86. Id. at 256.
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In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court was not concerned
about identifying how a particular person’s animus reached a
particular decisionmaker and affected that person’s decision.
Instead, the Court was broadly concerned with whether the
outcome was caused by the protected trait. Indeed, in Price
Waterhouse, the Court only generally connected the biased
comments to the outcome.
Hopkins showed that the partnership solicited evaluations from
all of the firm’s partners; that it generally relied very heavily on
such evaluations in making its decision; that some of the partners’
comments were the product of stereotyping; and that the firm in
no way disclaimed reliance on those particular comments, either
in Hopkins’ case or in the past. Certainly a plausible—and, one
might say, inevitable—conclusion to draw from this set of
circumstances is that the Policy Board in making its decision did
in fact take into account all of the partners’ comments, including
the comments that were motivated by stereotypical notions about
women’s proper deportment.87

Justice Sandra Day O’Connor noted in concurrence that
requiring the plaintiff to prove that there was one definitive cause
of an action would, “[p]articularly in the context of the professional
world, where decisions are often made by collegial bodies on the
basis of largely subjective criteria, . . . be tantamount to declaring
Title VII inapplicable to such decisions.”88
Rather, the Court was concerned with whether the outcome
was caused or impacted by a protected class. While the Supreme
Court did discuss motivation in Price Waterhouse, it was not a
technical discussion of a legal concept of intent, motive, or animus.
Rather, the discussion focused on what impacted the employer’s
decision, not what a particular individual’s motive was.89 Gender
affected the decision-making process even though some of the
comments submitted were not facially based on the plaintiff’s sex
(i.e., comments about her use of profanity).90
87. Id.
88. Id. at 273 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor’s concurrence did state that

the biased input played a substantial role in the decision. Additionally, she would have
required that the biased input constitute direct evidence.
89. Id. at 252.
90. Id. at 251 (noting that allowing gender stereotypes to affect the process
is discrimination).
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Second, Price Waterhouse did not identify most of the allegedly
biased individuals or describe what adverse action they intended.
Indeed, some of the people who described Hopkins in stereotypical
ways supported her candidacy.91 As discussed below, one way to
read Staub is that the biased individual must intend a negative
result and that same result must happen. However, in Price
Waterhouse, there was little information about what the people
who submitted biased comments intended, and there is evidence
that some of those people intended a positive outcome, not a
negative one.
Third, even though the Supreme Court identified individuals
with input as “partners,” it did not describe what authority these
partners had. Indeed, from the facts, it appears that many of the
partners only had the ability to make recommendations and not to
take any specific actions against Ms. Hopkins.
Finally, the Supreme Court did not use proximate cause to
resolve Price Waterhouse. The Court did not exclude the early
partner comments because of some notion that they were too
distant or unconnected from the final decision to legally remain
part of the causal chain.
Importantly, after Price Waterhouse, Congress amended Title VII
to codify the idea that a plaintiff can establish discrimination by
showing her protected class was a motivating factor in an outcome.
That amendment allows a plaintiff to prevail by showing “that race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for
any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated
the practice.”92 This language makes a connection between the
protected class and an outcome, not the bias of a
particular individual.
B. Desert Palace v. Costa
Courts also have a difficult time reconciling cat’s paw doctrine
with Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa.93 Here is how the Supreme Court
described the facts in that case:

91. Id. at 234.
92. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2018).
93. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 95–96 (2003).

1240

002.SPERINO_NO_HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1219

8/5/20 10:02 PM

Caught by the Cat’s Paw

Respondent experienced a number of problems with
management and her co-workers that led to an escalating series
of disciplinary sanctions, including informal rebukes, a denial of
privileges, and suspension. Petitioner finally terminated
respondent after she was involved in a physical altercation in a
warehouse elevator with fellow Teamsters member Herbert
Gerber. Petitioner disciplined both employees because the facts
surrounding the incident were in dispute, but Gerber, who had a
clean disciplinary record, received only a 5–day suspension.94

In this case, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff is not
required to provide direct evidence to prevail in a case where she
uses motivating factor as the causal standard. Instead, the Court
held “a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a
reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that ‘race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating
factor for any employment practice.’”95 The Supreme Court upheld
a jury’s verdict in the plaintiff’s favor.
As with Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court only generally
recounted how people were involved in the events leading up to
the plaintiff’s termination. The Court described some as
supervisors and some as co-workers, but it did not describe
specifically how any of them contributed to the outcome. Nor did
the Court describe what authority each person had. The Court did
not discuss agency issues or proximate cause.
The lower court decisions highlight the difficulties that courts
will have reconciling Desert Palace and cat’s paw. The appellate
court described differential treatment of the plaintiff by various
individuals. These individuals held at least somewhat supervisory
roles, though the court did not exactly know who the individuals
were, what authority they possessed, or how their treatment led to
the plaintiff’s termination. The Ninth Circuit en banc described a
portion of the facts as follows:
For example, when men came in late, they were often given
overtime to make up the lost time; when Costa came in late—in
one case, one minute late—she was issued a written reprimand,
known as a record of counseling. When men missed work for
medical reasons, they were given overtime to make up the lost

94. Id.
95. Id. at 101.
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time; when Costa missed work for medical reasons, she was
disciplined. On one occasion, a warehouse supervisor actually
suspended her because she had missed work while undergoing
surgery to remove a tumor; only the intervention of the director
of human resources voided this action.96

The Ninth Circuit then continued by describing numerous
instances in which various unnamed supervisors treated the
plaintiff more harshly than men, mostly resulting in disciplinary
write-ups for the plaintiff.97
The Ninth Circuit described how the employer justified its
termination decision relating to an altercation involving the
plaintiff and another employee. The plaintiff presented evidence
that the male employee shoved her against a wall. The male
employee alleged that the plaintiff hit him, which was contested.
Nonetheless, the company gave the male employee a suspension
and fired the plaintiff. The company asserted that the plaintiff was
fired because of the fight and because of her disciplinary history.98
It is unclear whether Desert Palace is strictly a cat’s paw case.
The plaintiff presented evidence that the person who signed the
discharge paperwork had expressed an intention to “get rid of that
bitch.”99 The Ninth Circuit panel recounted how three people were
involved in the decision to terminate the plaintiff, but there is no
discussion about how they made the decision to fire the plaintiff.100
As discussed below, there is an open question in current cat’s paw
doctrine about whether a case fits within cat’s paw when there is
evidence that one member of a multi-member decision-making
team exhibits bias, but there is not evidence that the majority of the
members were biased. Additionally, it is not clear in Desert Palace
whether the other “decisionmakers” knew about the alleged bias of
the other member.

96. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 845 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), aff’d, 539
U.S. 90 (2003).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 846.
99. Id. at 861.
100. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 268 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part en banc, 299 F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 2002), aff’d, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
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The Ninth Circuit en banc never described how the final
decision to fire the plaintiff was made and did not absolve the
company of liability because some of the decisionmakers did not
exhibit bias.
At the very least, Desert Palace shows that a plaintiff can use
disciplinary write-ups from individuals who are not final
decisionmakers to support her claim without going through the
hurdles imposed by a restrictive version of Staub. To use this
evidence, a plaintiff is not required to show that a supervisor with
animus intended an adverse action. Evidence of differential
discipline is sufficient when the disciplinary history is used in the
termination decision. Desert Palace also strongly suggests that if
there is evidence that one person in a multi-member decisionmaking team is biased, then cat’s paw is not the proper analysis.
C. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products is another case that
involves multiple inputs by multiple people.101 In that case, the
plaintiff Roger Reeves was fired at the age of fifty-seven after
working for his company for forty years. He worked in a
department called the Hinge Room.102 Joe Oswalt, who was in
his thirties, supervised the Hinge Room’s special line.103
Russell Caldwell, aged forty-five, supervised both the plaintiff
and Oswalt.104
Powe Chesnut was the company’s director of manufacturing.
Chesnut was married to the company’s president, Sandra
Sanderson.105 In 1995, Caldwell informed Chesnut that production
was down, and an audit found numerous timekeeping problems by
Caldwell, Oswalt, and the plaintiff.106 According to the Court,
“Chesnut, along with Dana Jester, vice president of human
resources, and Tom Whitaker, vice president of operations,
recommended to company president Sanderson that [plaintiff
Reeves] and Caldwell be fired.”107 Sanderson fired Reeves.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 137 (2000).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 137–38.
Id. at 138.
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In his age discrimination suit, the plaintiff presented evidence
contesting any timekeeping errors. The Supreme Court held that
this evidence of pretext was sufficient to prevail on his age
discrimination claim because a factfinder could infer that the noncredible reason was a pretext for age discrimination.108 The Court
left open the possibility that in some cases evidence of pretext
would not be sufficient for the plaintiff to prevail:
Certainly there will be instances where, although the plaintiff has
established a prima facie case and set forth sufficient evidence to
reject the defendant’s explanation, no rational factfinder could
conclude that the action was discriminatory. For instance, an
employer would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the
record conclusively revealed some other, nondiscriminatory
reason for the employer’s decision, or if the plaintiff created only
a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer’s reason was
untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent
evidence that no discrimination had occurred.109

Plaintiff also presented evidence that Chesnut told him that he
“was so old [he] must have come over on the Mayflower” and that
he “was too damn old to do [his] job.”110 In addition, plaintiff
presented evidence of Chesnut’s differential treatment of the
plaintiff and a younger employee.111
This case fits within the contours of what would later be called
a cat’s paw case. Sanderson made the formal decision to fire the
plaintiff, and there is no evidence recounted by the Supreme Court
that she had any age-based animus. Although the Court cryptically
noted that Chesnut was the person “behind [the] firing,”112 the
Court did not describe how Chesnut influenced Sanderson.
According to the Supreme Court’s account, two other individuals
were also involved in the decision, and the Court did not provide
any evidence that those two individuals were biased. The Court did
not even discuss how they influenced the decision in any detail.
Like other pre-Staub cases involving multiple decisionmakers,
the Supreme Court in Reeves was not concerned about connecting

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
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Id. at 148.
Id. at 151 (alterations in original).
See id.
Id. at 152.
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the bias of one person and the influence it had over another person.
In fact, the Court provided only the broadest details about the
unbiased individuals engaged in the decision-making process.
In Reeves, the Supreme Court again stressed the connection between
the protected class and the outcome.113
Nor did Reeves focus on what adverse action Chesnut intended.
Instead, the Court painted a broad picture of the evidence in favor
of the plaintiff, which included differential treatment by Chesnut,
age-related derogatory comments, and evidence that the reason the
employer fired the plaintiff was pretext.
The Supreme Court in Reeves did not overtly engage in any
agency analysis about whether Chesnut’s actions can be imputed
to the company, even though the facts strongly suggest that he did
not individually possess the power to fire the plaintiff. The Court
did not parse out his ability to take adverse actions or “tangible
employment actions,” nor did it try to determine whether he was a
supervisor in the technical sense that the company authorized him
to take such actions.
Finally, the Supreme Court did not use proximate cause to
resolve the case. The Court did not even provide a detailed timeline
about when all of the events in the case happened. Instead, the
Court broadly considered the evidence to determine whether it
supported the idea that age played a role in the termination.
D. Post-Staub: University of Texas
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar
The Supreme Court decided University of Texas Southwestern
Medical Center v. Nassar two years after Staub.114 Even though Nassar
has facts that arguably fit within cat’s paw, the Court did not use a
cat’s paw analysis to resolve the case.
In Nassar, the plaintiff alleged that a medical school for which
he worked discriminated against him based on his race, national
origin, and religion.115 The plaintiff quit his job at the medical

113. Id. at 141.
114. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013).
115. Id. at 345; Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., No. 3:08-CV-1337-B, 2010 WL

3000877, at *1 (N.D. Tex. July 27, 2010), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 674 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2012),
vacated, 570 U.S. 338 (2013).
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school and sought a physician position at the medical school’s
affiliated hospital.116
When it appeared the hospital would extend the plaintiff an
offer, the plaintiff quit his job at the medical school.117 He wrote a
letter indicating that he was quitting because of religious, racial,
and cultural bias.118 A medical school official responded negatively
to this letter and reached out to the hospital, informing it that
offering the plaintiff a job was inconsistent with an agreement
between the medical school and the hospital.119 The hospital
rescinded the offer.120
The Supreme Court considered the plaintiff’s retaliation claim.
This case arguably presented a cat’s paw scenario. The medical
school official allegedly possessed the retaliatory motive. The
separate hospital rescinded the offer. The medical school official
did not have the power to rescind the offer made by the hospital, a
separate entity. Instead, it could be argued that the medical school
administrator used the hospital to retaliate against the plaintiff.
However, like the other cases discussed in this Part, the Court
did not use a cat’s paw analysis to resolve the case. Importantly,
Nassar did not focus on the intent or motive of any individual.
Rather, it focused on factual cause.121 It also focused on the
wrongful actions of the employer, and did not use an agency
analysis to impute liability to the employer based on the
individuals who worked for the employer.122 The Court held that
the required connection was between the protected activity and the
adverse action.123 The Court did not use a proximate cause analysis.
Importantly, even though Nassar was decided after Staub, the
Supreme Court did not cite to Staub or use its framework to resolve
the case.

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
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Nassar, 570 U.S. at 344–45.
Id. at 344.
Id.
Id. at 345.
Id.
See generally id.
Id. at 360.
Id. at 362.
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E. Summary
Prior to Staub, courts did not need or use a cat’s paw analysis to
resolve cases that arguably fit within a cat’s paw model. Indeed,
there are even other canonical Supreme Court cases where the
Court did not describe who made the contested decision, only
reiterating the parties’ contentions and evidence about the reason
behind the decision.124
In these cases, the Supreme Court did not locate the supposedly
biased individual and trace his or her motive through to its
influence on an unbiased person. Many of these cases do not
describe in detail who made the final decision and how bias
impacted that person. The cases do not require proof that a biased
person intended a particular kind of adverse action. The Supreme
Court did not rely on the status of the allegedly biased individual
to determine employer liability. Nor did the Court rely on a
proximate cause analysis.
From these cases, two broad themes emerge. The Supreme
Court did not need a separate cat’s paw doctrine to resolve them.
Instead, the Court relied on whether there was a connection
between the protected trait or protected activity and the outcome.
Additionally, these cases suggest that viewing Staub to robustly
limit discrimination claims is problematic. Indeed, as discussed in
Part IV, it is difficult to reconcile Staub with many of these cases.
III. A CAREFUL LOOK AT SHAGER
The cat’s paw theory got its catchy name in the Seventh Circuit
case, Shager v. Upjohn Co.125 Surprisingly, Shager did not actually
rely on cat’s paw doctrine for its central holding. The cat’s paw
discussion is dicta.
Shager actually held that a plaintiff may get past summary
judgment through multiple evidentiary paths and is not required
to jump through a cat’s paw analysis. The Seventh Circuit did not
need any theory with a catchy name to resolve the case. And, as
discussed below, the Seventh Circuit admitted as much, repeatedly

124. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 526 F.3d 356, 358 (8th Cir.
2008), vacated, 557 U.S. 167 (2009).
125. Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990).
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stating that the plaintiff possessed multiple kinds of evidence that
considered individually would have been sufficient to allow the
plaintiff to go to trial.
Re-focusing on Shager reveals two important points. First, a
cat’s paw theory was not necessary. Second, the Seventh Circuit
recognized numerous kinds of evidence outside of cat’s paw that a
plaintiff can use to survive summary judgment that must be viewed
outside the lens of the cat’s paw doctrine.
In Shager, the plaintiff alleged that his younger supervisor
exaggerated his performance deficiencies and did not recognize his
outstanding sales performance, while applying different standards
to other, younger sales representatives.126 The employer contested
the plaintiff’s evidence and offered evidence that it fired the
plaintiff for performance deficiencies.127 The younger supervisor
recommended that the plaintiff be fired to a committee that
reviewed personnel actions.128
In Shager, the Seventh Circuit recognized that holding an older
worker to a higher performance standard than younger workers
and then firing him based on the differential standard is not simply
evidence of discrimination, it actually is age discrimination.129 No
further evidence is necessary to establish a violation of law. Indeed,
differential treatment is at the core of discrimination law.130
The plaintiff also submitted evidence that the company
replaced him with a younger worker and that the younger
supervisor evaluated that younger employee noting, “It is
refreshing to work with a young man with such a wonderful
outlook on life and on his job,” though in fact the Seventh Circuit
indicated the younger worker’s “performance had not been
distinguished.”131 These facts also supported the plaintiff’s age
discrimination claim. Importantly, this evidence did not involve the
committee who reviewed the plaintiff’s termination. This evidence
did not rely on cat’s paw.

126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id. at 400–01.
Id. at 400.
See id. at 402 (noting that the plaintiff did not even need to rely on the McDonnell
Douglas pretext inquiry).
130. See generally McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (holding
that disciplining white employees more harshly than others is discrimination).
131. Shager, 913 F.2d at 400.
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The plaintiff also presented evidence that the younger
supervisor said to a younger salesman, “[t]hese older people
don’t much like or much care for us baby boomers, but there
isn’t much they can do about it,” and that he frequently made
comments that “the old guys know how to get around things.”132
The Seventh Circuit noted that the trial court had improperly
labeled these age-related comments as “stray remarks,” and that
these comments were also evidence of discrimination.133
The Seventh Circuit even noted that the company’s replacement
of the plaintiff with a younger worker combined with a spurious
reason for his termination would be enough evidence to survive a
motion for summary judgment.134
Shager then took a strange turn. The court turned to the
argument of whether the committee’s decision somehow shielded
the company from liability.135 This is strange for a number of
reasons. First, the Seventh Circuit had already catalogued a number
of separate evidentiary paths upon which the plaintiff could
establish liability. Second, some of that evidence did not depend on
the action taken by the committee. There is no evidence that the
committee was involved in hiring a young employee and in making
age-related remarks about that new employee’s performance.
The Seventh Circuit in Shager appeared to struggle with how
agency ideas intersect with employer liability. In another case, the
Supreme Court had suggested that employers would not be liable
for all sexual harassment that occurred in the workplace.136
Although the Supreme Court would later address the issue of
employer liability for sexual harassment in two cases,137 the Court
had not decided these cases at the time the Seventh Circuit decided
Shager. However, the Seventh Circuit was grappling with how to
reconcile statements the Supreme Court made about agency in the
harassment context to the facts of Shager.

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id. at 402.
Id.
Id. at 405.
Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
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The Seventh Circuit could not even decide whether it was
discussing derivative liability or the employer’s direct liability.138
An employer’s derivative liability would be based solely on the fact
that it is liable for the acts of its agents. An employer’s direct
liability would be based on the acts or omissions the employer
allowed. Although Title VII and the ADEA do not distinguish these
two types of liability and do explicitly allow for the employer to be
liable for the acts of agents, the Supreme Court later made these
distinctions important in the harassment context.139 Importantly, all
of this discussion about agency and cat’s paw was dicta.
It is clear from the Seventh Circuit’s discussion that it was not
creating a threshold which all plaintiffs in cases involving a biased
individual and a later decisionmaker must overcome. It simply
noted that, given the facts of the case, the committee action did not
absolve the company of liability. Then inexplicably, the Seventh
Circuit stated, “If the Career Path Committee was not a mere rubber
stamp, but made an independent decision to fire Shager, not only
would there be no ground for finding willful misconduct by [the
employer], there would be no ground for finding even an innocent
violation of the Act.”140 This sentence is unconnected from the prior
discussion about agency, but it is from this one sentence that much
of the later mischief follows.
The Seventh Circuit implied that once an employee is singled
out for negative treatment based on biased information, a
subsequent decisionmaker could somehow make an independent
decision that justified the negative outcome. This ignores that, in
many instances, the ultimate decisionmaker would not be making
any decision at all without the biased input and that singling out
the employee for further scrutiny because of a protected class is
also discriminatory.
Although Shager is often cited as a cat’s paw case,141 this is
inaccurate. A careful review of Shager reveals important insights
that courts need post-Staub to determine how and whether to apply
a robust cat’s paw analysis. First, not all evidence in cases with a
biased person and a later decisionmaker is evidence related to cat’s

138.
139.
140.
141.
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Shager, 913 F.2d at 404.
29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2018); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2018). See generally supra note 136.
Shager, 913 F.2d at 406.
See, e.g., Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 584 (7th Cir. 2004).
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paw. In Shager, some of the evidence did not involve the committee
or its recommendation at all. Second, the Seventh Circuit in Shager
identified multiple ways for the plaintiff to survive summary
judgment that did not involve a cat’s paw analysis, including
evidence of differential treatment, pretext, and the hiring of a
younger worker to replace the plaintiff. Third, Shager did not hold
that if a case cannot survive a cat’s paw analysis then it is not viable.
Most importantly, the court that coined the phrase “cat’s paw” did
not rely on cat’s paw to resolve the case.
IV. RECONCILING STAUB
The only way to reconcile Staub with the other cases discussed
in this Article is to either re-imagine their facts or to abandon cat’s
paw as a separate doctrine with any restrictive, independent
content. I argue that the better path is to abandon cat’s paw as a
separate doctrine and instead re-frame the inquiry using the
parameters of the statutory text, which allow a plaintiff to prevail
by connecting her protected trait to a negative outcome.142 If the
courts are unwilling to abolish cat’s paw, then Shager shows how
cat’s paw can be greatly diminished.
Under Staub, “if a supervisor performs an act motivated by
[impermissible] animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause
an adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause
of the ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable.”143
One way to read Staub is that it is just expressing one way to
prove a discrimination claim and that its words of limitation
are meaningless.
In other words, even though the Supreme Court left open the
question of whether co-workers could be the biased actors, the
Court did not mean that the doctrine only applies when a
supervisor is involved. Co-workers can start the sequence of events,
as can others who do not have supervisory power, such as
customers. Likewise, the words in Staub that require the supervisor
to intend an adverse action are also not words of limitation.
The plaintiff can prevail by showing the facts as stated in Staub, but
there are also other ways the plaintiff can prevail. For example, the

142. This is not the only way a plaintiff could prevail under the statute.
143. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 422 (2011) (footnote omitted).
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plaintiff might be able to prevail if she shows that the biased
individual intended one result and another result happened.
And, the plaintiff can prevail if the biased individual did not intend
any particular result, but an adverse outcome resulted.
Currently the lower courts are struggling with these questions:
who can start the sequence of events, what that person must intend,
how the person who initiates the sequence must interact with
others, and how the initial impetus must impact the outcome?144
The answers to these questions vary widely right now.
A. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
Courts are grappling with Staub, but they fail to realize that,
unless cat’s paw is almost meaningless as a separate doctrine, it is
difficult to reconcile with Price Waterhouse. Recall that in Price
Waterhouse, the Court addressed a woman’s claim that Price
Waterhouse denied her partnership based on the biased input of
numerous individuals.145 In Price Waterhouse, the Court allowed the
plaintiff to submit evidence from a wide range of people, and, other
than describing these individuals as partners, the Court did not
describe whether the partners had any supervisory power over
the plaintiff.146
If the Court ultimately holds that supervisory status is required,
the question about who counts as a supervisor is going to be tricky.
In another context, the Court has held that a supervisor is a person
who has the ability to take a tangible employment action.147 A
tangible employment action is a term of art in employment
discrimination law that is reserved for relatively serious outcomes,
like failure to hire, termination, or failure to promote.148 However,
this definition does not make sense in the cat’s paw scenario
because if the supervisor had the power to take the negative action,
a cat’s paw analysis would typically be unnecessary. The biased

144.
145.
146.
147.

See cases discussed infra Section V.B.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 232–33 (1989).
Id. at 233.
Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 424 (2013). In Vance, the Court considered
whether a person who could make some day-to-day decisions about the plaintiff’s work
counted as a supervisor, if the person did not have the power to terminate the plaintiff.
Id. at 425–26.
148. Id. at 431.
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individual would just fire or demote the plaintiff and would not
need the unbiased individual to take the action.
But if supervisor status remains as a required element for cat’s
paw liability, then it is very unlikely that every partner who
submitted biased information about the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse
could be classified as her supervisor. Indeed the expert testimony
in the case suggested that some of the negative feedback came from
partners “who knew Hopkins only slightly.”149 Unless the courts
view Staub as simply expressing a way that a plaintiff can prevail,
they will have a difficult time explaining which partner comments
counted towards Hopkins’s claim against Price Waterhouse and
which did not count. Of course, this leads to additional questions:
why would courts want to make these formal distinctions at all, and
how could courts ground such distinctions in the text or purpose of
the federal discrimination statutes.
Further, some of the negative comments about Hopkins appear
to be based on staff complaints about her.150 Under current cat’s
paw doctrine, it is unclear what would happen if a supervisor
passes along the biased complaints of non-supervisors. This issue
gets complicated because the supervisor who passes along
comments could be biased himself or could be passing along
complaints about women, but not similar comments about men.
The supervisor could just be passing the complaints along, without
recognizing that they might be based on differential expectations
about how men and women should behave; that is, that women
should be nice, but that men are not expected to be nice. The
supervisor might also equally pass along similar complaints about
men. A restrictive cat’s paw doctrine does not precisely describe
what should happen in such a scenario, although the Court in Price
Waterhouse did not feel the need to address this at all. Thus, Price
Waterhouse militates against a view of the cat’s paw doctrine that
requires supervisory status as an element.
A restrictive version of the cat’s paw doctrine also appears to
require the “biased” individual to intend a negative action. In Staub,
the Court held that “if a supervisor performs an act motivated by
antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an
adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of
149. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235.
150. Id.
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the ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable.”151
However, in Price Waterhouse, though some people wanted the
plaintiff to be promoted to partner, they still submitted negative
information about the plaintiff that may have been founded on
stereotypes of differential expectations between men and
women.152 Nonetheless, the stereotyped comments negatively
impacted the plaintiff. Cat’s paw doctrine, as enunciated in Staub,
does not currently anticipate this set of events. It is unclear what
should happen under Staub if a supervisor who otherwise supports
an employee and wants the employee to succeed, passes along
biased, negative information that ultimately contributes to a
negative outcome.
Additionally, Price Waterhouse did not carefully connect what
each partner intended with the ultimate outcome. Some of the
partners recommended that the firm deny Hopkins partnership,
others wanted Hopkins to become a partner, some indicated they
did not have enough information to state an opinion about her
partnership, and still others submitted an evaluation without
making any kind of indication about how that evaluation should
factor into her candidacy.153 In Price Waterhouse, the Court did not
seem to believe that such information was relevant to determining
whether the employer discriminated against the plaintiff.
However, a restrictive view of Staub seems to require a court to
discern which people intended a negative outcome.
Further, Price Waterhouse did not use a proximate cause
analysis. Indeed, to the extent that Staub suggests that a proximate
cause analysis is required in cat’s paw cases, the proximate cause
would need to be broad enough to encompass facts similar to Price
Waterhouse, which embrace a wide range of comments, from a wide
range of people, over a long period of time, and from multiple
decision-making bodies.
The Supreme Court also did not frame Price Waterhouse in terms
of agency analysis. The Court did not find biased individuals who
151. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 422 (2011) (footnote omitted).
152. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 234–35 (“Another supporter explained that Hopkins

ha[d] matured from a tough-talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed [manager] to an
authoritative, formidable, but much more appealing lady [partner] candidate.”
(first alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
153. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1113 (D.D.C. 1985), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev’d, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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were sufficient agents of the employer and base liability on that
derivative liability. Instead, it appeared to hold the company liable
for the outcome by aggregating all the acts of the employees with
the employer’s own failure to prevent bias and stereotypes from
infecting its process for selecting partners.
Price Waterhouse also points to another problem with cat’s paw.
Some of the comments were clearly sexist. Others were not facially
sexist but reflected sex stereotypes, and still other comments were
negative but may or may not have reflected stereotypes. Now that
cat’s paw doctrine exists, a question remains about how to reconcile
it with this set of facts. Does Price Waterhouse fall outside cat’s paw
because some of the comments were clearly based on the plaintiff’s
sex? Is the court required to apply cat’s paw analysis to the
comments that are not facially based on sex? Cat’s paw doctrine
invites this kind of further discussion, but it is a discussion not
worth having. Price Waterhouse already provides a workable way
forward, especially given that Congress largely codified that
framework in the 1991 amendments to Title VII.
B. Desert Palace v. Costa
If cat’s paw is a restrictive, separate doctrine, it also will be hard
to reconcile it with Desert Palace.154 In that case, the Supreme Court
only generally described an escalating series of problems between
plaintiff and her co-workers and management.155 Recall that the
Court described the facts as follows:
Respondent experienced a number of problems with
management and her co-workers that led to an escalating series
of disciplinary sanctions, including informal rebukes, a denial of
privileges, and suspension. Petitioner finally terminated
respondent after she was involved in a physical altercation in a
warehouse elevator with fellow Teamsters member Herbert
Gerber. Petitioner disciplined both employees because the facts
surrounding the incident were in dispute, but Gerber, who had a
clean disciplinary record, received only a 5–day suspension.156

154. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
155. Id. at 95–96.
156. Id.
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Like Price Waterhouse, the Court does not recount who had the
required bias, what supervisory authority those individuals
possessed, or what each one of them intended. The Court does not
discuss agency issues or proximate cause.
Importantly, much of the evidence in Desert Palace related to
disciplinary write-ups given to the plaintiff over a long period of
time by various individuals.157 It is not clear that when a supervisor
gives a person a disciplinary notice that the supervisor intends to
have the person fired (the end result in Desert Palace). Given how
many write-ups were given to the plaintiff Costa, it does not even
appear to be substantially certain that a write-up would lead to
termination. However, whether the supervisors intended for Costa
to be fired or not, the write-ups played a role in her ultimate
termination. The company stated that it fired her because of both
the fight and her disciplinary history.158
One reading of Staub appears to suggest that the biased
individual must intend the outcome that later happens. The lower
courts are considering this issue.159 However, requiring a plaintiff
to prove that the biased individual intended the outcome would be
at odds with the facts of Desert Palace. Desert Palace suggests that it
is enough if the biased negative action played a role in the outcome,
whether the individual intended a particular outcome or not. The
Court did not describe how each of the incidents in the disciplinary
history contributed to the outcome and what each person in the
disciplinary chain intended as the outcome.160
Additionally, much of the evidence in Desert Palace related to
differential treatment of the plaintiff compared to the men with
whom she worked.161 As discussed throughout this Article, it is not
clear how such evidence intersects with a cat’s paw analysis.
Differential treatment because of a protected trait is discrimination,
whether it presents as a cat’s paw scenario or not.
As mentioned earlier, Desert Palace is not strictly a cat’s paw
case because the plaintiff presented evidence that the person who
signed the discharge paperwork had expressed an intention to “get
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
Id. at 96.
See, e.g., Chattman v. Toho Tenax Am., Inc., 686 F.3d 339, 352 n.11 (6th Cir. 2012).
Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 95–96.
See generally Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 2002)
(en banc), aff’d, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
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rid of that bitch.”162 However, three people were involved in the
decision to terminate Costa, and the Court did not describe in detail
how these three reached their decision.163 This raises all sorts of
questions about cat’s paw analysis. Does cat’s paw not apply if any
person along the causal chain who also has the power to take an
adverse action is biased? What happens if the other people in the
causal chain who also had that power were not biased and were not
influenced by any prior biased input? Does it matter what the
relationship among the people looks like?
The answers to these questions require a very precise parsing
of who had what power and how that power was exercised. The
endless variations of how multiple people can reach an outcome
will wreak havoc on cat’s paw analysis. For example, will cat’s paw
apply if one member of a multi-member panel is biased, but the
panel has an unbiased chairperson who can veto the
recommendations of the group? What happens if the biased panel
member presents information to the group but recuses himself
from the voting process regarding the plaintiff? The parade of
variables is endless. It is difficult to reconcile a restrictive view of
cat’s paw analysis with Desert Palace.
C. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.
Similar problems exist reconciling a restrictive version of the
cat’s paw doctrine with Reeves.
In Reeves, at least four people were involved in the decision to
fire the plaintiff.164 The Supreme Court did not provide any facts
suggesting that three of the four people were acting because of the
plaintiff’s age. The Supreme Court did not really describe the
decision-making process in detail. It noted that Chesnut (the
allegedly biased individual), along with a vice president of human
resources and a vice president of operations, recommended to the
company president that the company should fire the plaintiff.165
It is not clear what power Chesnut had compared to the others.
162. Id. at 861.
163. Unlike the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit panel did address the multi-member

decision-making aspect of Desert Palace. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 268 F.3d 882, 888
(9th Cir. 2001), aff’d in part, rev’d in part en banc, 299 F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 2002), aff’d, 539 U.S. 90
(2003) (identifying “one of three [alleged] decisionmakers in Costa’s termination”).
164. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 138 (2000).
165. Id.
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It could be argued that Reeves fits nicely within the current cat’s
paw doctrine because the Supreme Court noted that Chesnut was
the person “behind [the] firing.”166 However, it is not clear from the
Supreme Court’s description in what way he was “behind the
firing.” More detail is required here because in many cat’s paw
cases, the plaintiff is alleging that the biased person was really
“behind the firing.”
Additionally, Reeves presents another complicating factor.
Chesnut was married to the company president, who ultimately
made the final decision to fire the plaintiff. Does this relationship
change cat’s paw analysis in any way? For example, imagine a
slightly different scenario where Chesnut was the plaintiff’s coworker and did not possess any supervisory authority. Now
imagine, this co-worker Chesnut was married to the company
president and made false reports about the plaintiff’s work because
of the plaintiff’s protected class. If cat’s paw analysis is ultimately
going to distinguish liability between co-workers and supervisors,
then the doctrine will need to contend with co-workers who have
special relationships with people in power, including familial and
sexual relationships.
Recall also that the plaintiff in Reeves relied on multiple kinds
of evidence to support the outcome. In addition to age-related
comments, the plaintiff also relied on evidence that the reason
given for his termination was incorrect or not true.167 He also
presented evidence of Chesnut’s differential treatment of the
plaintiff and a younger individual. It is not clear how cat’s paw
intersects with other evidentiary paths.
Additionally, to the extent that cat’s paw is about agency, it will
need to create an agency analysis that is compatible with Reeves.
The facts of the case strongly suggest that the allegedly biased
individual did not possess the power to fire the plaintiff. The Court
did not parse out his ability to take “tangible employment actions,”
nor did it try to determine whether he was a supervisor in the
technical sense that the company authorized him to take such
actions. Finally, any proximate cause analysis would need to
contend with the facts of Reeves.

166. Id. at 152.
167. Id. at 148.
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D. University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar
Nassar also points to additional questions related to a restrictive
cat’s paw analysis. Recall that in Nassar, a person working for the
medical school reached out to a separate entity (the hospital), and
the hospital rescinded the job offer.168
Nassar strongly suggests that cat’s paw analysis works across
multiple entities.169 If so, it is unclear why the biased actor would
need to be a supervisor. In many instances, the second entity would
not be in a position to know or understand the power that the
biased actor was exerting. For example, imagine a biased human
resources professional gives a negative report to a potential
employer who calls to ask about a person’s job performance. The
potential employer decides not to hire the individual. In this
scenario, it is unclear why it would matter if the human resources
professional was a supervisor in any sense. To the extent that cat’s
paw doctrine is about agency, this scenario raises questions about
apparent authority and whether it would be a separate basis for
holding the employer liable.
Nassar also begs the question of whether the second entity in
the cat’s paw could be liable for retaliation. The basic structure of
cat’s paw analysis suggests that the second employer might be
liable because it allowed itself to be used as the tool of another (the
employee of the first employer), who may have been acting for
retaliatory reasons.
E. Reconciling Staub with Shager
Reconciling Staub and Shager also poses hurdles for a restrictive
cat’s paw doctrine. These relate to two overarching questions. First,
does cat’s paw apply when some of the evidence is not part of a
cat’s paw, in that it is not part of a biased individual influencing
another person? Second, how should a court differentiate cat’s paw
evidence from other types of evidence that on their own may be
sufficient to establish liability without relying on the cat’s paw?
Cat’s paw doctrine appears to apply in cases where one person
is influencing another or an outcome. However, not all evidence
that supports a finding of discrimination rests on this relationship.
168. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 345 (2013).
169. Id. at 350–51.
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Recall that in Shager, some of the evidence did not involve the
committee or its recommendation at all. Instead, the plaintiff
presented evidence that the company hired a younger person to
replace him and then treated that new hire more favorably.170
This presents a wrinkle for cat’s paw doctrine. Does a case fit
within cat’s paw if only some of the evidence relies on a cat’s paw
relationship? If so, it only makes sense to evaluate the cat’s paw
evidence through the lens of cat’s paw doctrine. How would a court
weigh other evidence of discrimination that does not depend on the
cat’s paw relationship? In many cases, existing employment
discrimination jurisprudence would allow a plaintiff to get to a jury
and ultimately prevail on this evidence alone.
Additionally, even evidence that fits within the parameters of
cat’s paw is sufficient on its own to establish discrimination without
the trappings of the cat’s paw analysis. In Shager, the Seventh
Circuit determined that the plaintiff had presented multiple
streams of evidence, each of which on its own would have been
sufficient for the plaintiff to prevail.171 The Seventh Circuit focused
on evidence of differential treatment and pretext, both of which are
sufficient under current discrimination law to establish
discrimination.172 If courts assert a restrictive cat’s paw doctrine,
they will need to answer endless questions about how the doctrine
affects other ways that a plaintiff may prove discrimination. In
Shager, cat’s paw is an afterthought, not the primary lens through
which the court viewed the evidence.
This Part shows that it is difficult to reconcile a restrictive cat’s
paw analysis with a wide swath of Supreme Court employment
discrimination jurisprudence or with the case that named cat’s paw
as a separate doctrine.173

170.
171.
172.
173.

Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 400 (7th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 400–02.
Id.
In addition to the cases discussed in this Article, there are other Supreme Court
cases that may also raise cat’s paw issues because the Supreme Court described the case in
general terms, but lower courts described the cases in ways that suggest cat’s paw issues.
See, e.g., White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 310 F.3d 443, 447 (6th Cir. 2002), reh’g en
banc granted, vacated, 321 F.3d 1203 (6th Cir. 2003), and district court aff’d, 364 F.3d 789 (6th Cir.
2004), aff’d, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (noting that the first action taken against a plaintiff by a
supervisor came after complaints from three non-supervisors, suggesting a cat’s paw issue).
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V. ABANDON CAT’S PAW
Reconciling a restrictive cat’s paw doctrine with past Supreme
Court case law is impossible. This Part pulls together an overview
of the questions a court must answer to reconcile cat’s paw with
existing case law. The sheer number of questions suggests that
continuing to develop a restrictive cat’s paw doctrine is a mistake.
Instead, courts should recognize that evidence of discrimination
can take many forms across many relationships and that the key
question in many cat’s paw scenarios is causation.
The courts could accomplish this in many ways. The most
forthright way would be to admit that labeling some scenarios as
“cat’s paw” cases and creating a doctrine around it was simply a
mistake. In the courts’ haste to recognize that a particular set of facts
might constitute discrimination, the courts unnecessarily created a
doctrine that appeared to limit those claims. The courts could also
retain cat’s paw, but then hold that Staub did not intend to place
limits on it.
A. Unanswered Questions
Developing a restrictive cat’s doctrine is problematic because it
will involve the courts in an avalanche of issues that are not
required by the texts or purposes of the federal discrimination
statutes. This section pulls together many of the questions that the
courts would need to answer to try to reconcile cat’s paw with the
Supreme Court cases discussed in this Article.
One line of questions relates to the status of the biased
individual. The lower courts are currently struggling with
problems such as these:
• Can co-workers start the chain of events?174
• Can subordinates of the plaintiff start the chain of events?175
• Can customers or others who are not supervisors or
co-workers start the chain of events?176
174. Vasquez v. Empress Ambulance Serv., Inc., 835 F.3d 267, 274 (2d Cir. 2016)
(applying an agency analysis to consider liability for co-worker input).
175. Smith v. Comhar, Inc., 722 F. App’x 314, 318 (3d Cir. 2018) (noting that the circuit
has never decided whether cat’s paw theory could apply when allegedly biased individuals
were subordinate to the plaintiff).
176. Daniel v. Sargent & Lundy, L.L.C., No. 09 C 7206, 2012 WL 874419, at *11 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 14, 2012).
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Co-worker status may be important in some cases because it
may point to a problem with causation. The co-worker’s actions
may be so far removed from the decision that no reasonable jury
would find that the co-worker’s bias caused the outcome. In many
(but not all) instances, a co-worker’s input would be farther
removed from an outcome than a supervisor’s input would be.
However, because the Court enshrined the concept of “supervisor”
into cat’s paw (and left open the question of what happens with
co-worker bias), lower courts are diverted into believing that
co-worker/supervisor status might be the relevant issue, rather
than causation.
If the courts draw a line about what kinds of status create
liability, then the courts will need to create a doctrine to define who
falls within each status. For example, if the courts claim that only
supervisors can create a cat’s paw, they will need to define what
“supervisor” means. The Court has already defined “supervisor”
in the harassment agency context; however, the court-created
definition is still ambiguous and does not fit well with what
reasonable workers would believe the term means.177
Additionally, the harassment agency definition of “supervisor”
requires the supervisor to be able to take a tangible employment
action or that the employer essentially delegate this authority to the
individual by relying on her input.178 This definition does not work
well in the cat’s paw context. If the biased individual possessed the
authority to take tangible employment actions, the biased
individual could just take the action and would not need to
encourage others to take it. The courts would need to define
“supervisor” in at least two different ways: one for purposes of
harassment/agency doctrine and the other for purposes of cat’s
paw. Given that the word “supervisor” does not even appear in the
federal discrimination statutes, it seems strange to develop two
different definitions of “supervisor.”
Further, as Justice Ginsburg pointed out in the
harassment/agency context, any definition of supervisor is likely
to be unsatisfactory given the infinite variety in the workplace.179

177. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 431 (2013).
178. See, e.g., Cole v. Mgmt. & Training Corp., No. 4:11CV-118-JHM, 2014 WL 2612561,

at *3 (W.D. Ky. June 11, 2014) (trying to navigate various definitions of supervisor).
179. Vance, 570 U.S. at 454, 464–65 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Employers allow many different people with many different titles
to make workplace decisions. Creating a rule that is flexible enough
to draw the proper line is extraordinarily difficult.
Even if the courts were willing to navigate all of these problems,
there would still be unanswered questions. Recall that in Price
Waterhouse, some of the partners appeared to be passing along
critiques of the plaintiff’s performance given to them by staff when
the partner had little contact with the plaintiff. It is unclear whether
courts would count this conduct as the conduct of the supervisor or
the conduct of the non-supervisory staff.
It also is unclear whether a person is a supervisor for purposes
of cat’s paw if they possessed power to take some actions, but not
the contested action. For example, some employers may allow
certain people to participate in hiring decisions, but have different
people make termination decisions. If a supervisor only has
the power to hire, is that person a supervisor if the plaintiff
contests a termination?
Even if the courts could define the status of participants in the
cat’s paw, there would be many sets of facts that would not fall
neatly within the defined categories. For example, if the courts
decide that a co-worker cannot create cat’s paw liability, the
courts may need to create a different rule for co-workers who have
special relationships with the decisionmaker, such as family or
sexual relationships.
The courts are also going to need to figure out what the
“biased” individual needs to intend. Staub’s cat’s paw doctrine was
created in a fact scenario where there was evidence suggesting the
biased individual wanted to get the plaintiff fired and the employer
fired the plaintiff.180 However, many of the Supreme Court cases
discussed in this Article do not recount what the “biased”
individual intended. Indeed, in Price Waterhouse, some of the people
that supported the plaintiff’s candidacy submitted sex-based
comments about her performance.181 Further, the biased individual
may work for one employer and pass along information to another
employer. Is the first employer liable when it could not effectuate
the intended result? Is the second employer liable for using
the information?
180. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 422 (2011).
181. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 234 (1989).
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And, there are fact scenarios where a biased individual may
intend one consequence and another consequence occurs.
For example, the biased supervisor may want to get the plaintiff
fired, but the company retains her and denies her a later promotion.
Or the biased individual may want to discipline the plaintiff, but
she is fired instead. Likewise, there may be many instances where
there is no way to credibly determine what the supervisor intended
in a specific sense.
The courts also must figure out how biased input would affect
decision-making processes that have multiple tiers or involve
multiple people. What if only some of the people in the process
receive the biased information? For example, what happens if an
employer designates a three-person committee to determine
whether to fire individuals? A supervisor reports biased
information to one member on the committee, but the other two
individuals do not receive the information in any way. The other
two individuals vote to terminate the employee based on
completely separate information. What happens if two of the
members receive the biased information, but the third member
does not? What if one member of the committee has more formal
power than others on the committee? If cat’s paw doctrine develops
in a restrictive way, courts will need to determine how an endless
variety of factual scenarios fit within it.
Even if the courts can define the required relationship and what
is intended, the courts will need to define whether certain fact
scenarios simply fall outside of cat’s paw analysis. For example,
what if a supervisor passes along information that facially conveys
that the protected trait played a role in the decision, and the
ultimate decisionmaker relies on it? This should fall outside the
reach of cat’s paw. It is likely that comments that convey
stereotypes might also fall outside of the cat’s paw. Additionally, if
a decisionmaker relies on information from a person that the
decisionmaker knows to be biased, this also does not seem to fit
well in the cat’s paw paradigm. But, defining what fits in and what
fits outside of cat’s paw will be an impossible task.182
Additionally, what if the biased person has the power to take
the action, but chooses to have others make the employment
182. Courts have had similar difficulties defining the difference between direct and
circumstantial evidence.
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decision? For example, what if a biased person is part of a multimember decision-making group, submits information to that
group, but then recuses himself from the decision-making? It is
unclear if this is a cat’s paw scenario. Staub does not fully anticipate
that people with power may try to get others to carry out an action.
Courts also would need to decide how to handle cases that
present evidence beyond just cat’s paw evidence. All evidence of
discrimination cannot be analyzed under the cat’s paw doctrine
because the cat’s paw structure does not work for all kinds of
evidence. Reconciling cat’s paw with all of the different analytical
structures that the courts use to evaluate discrimination claims is a
decades-long project.
Staub also inserts a proximate cause analysis into cat’s paw
doctrine. Creating a proximate cause doctrine that is consistent
with all past Supreme Court employment discrimination case law,
as well as the text and purposes of the statute, is not only daunting
but unnecessary. Title VII existed for more than forty years without
any need for proximate cause analysis. Indeed, as I discuss
extensively in prior work, the statute itself performs the work of
proximate cause by defining the people protected by it, the entities
liable for discrimination, and defenses and affirmative defenses
to liability.183
Finally, to the extent that cat’s paw doctrine represents the
courts’ struggles with agency analysis, the emerging doctrine will
need to be reconciled with all past Supreme Court cases that have
an agency component.184 No easy task.
B. The Path Forward
As shown in the prior section, the parade of variables is endless.
Courts cannot credibly resolve cat’s paw cases through an elaborate
set of rules. If they try to do so, the rules will be subject to so many
exceptions and exceptions to exceptions that they will be useless.

183. See generally Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, supra note 53 (discussing how
proximate cause in statutes cannot typically be coterminous with common law
proximate cause).
184. See also Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).

1265

002.SPERINO_NO_HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

8/5/20 10:02 PM

2019

Additionally, a restrictive cat’s paw doctrine would be at odds with
prior Supreme Court precedent.185
Further, it is likely the courts would start drawing factual
conclusions from specific scenarios, even though the conclusions
are not supported by the lived reality of workers. For example, the
courts might start opining that workers are not harmed when a coworker falsely reports negative conduct to a supervisor because the
co-worker does not have official authority over the individual. This
would be formalism at its worst.
More importantly, any restrictive cat’s paw doctrine would
stray far from the text or purposes of the federal discrimination
statutes. Title VII is the cornerstone federal employment
discrimination statute. Title VII prohibits an employer from
discriminating against a worker because of race, sex, national
origin, color, or religion.186 Title VII’s main operative provision
consists of two subparts. Under the first subpart, it is an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to do the following:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.187

Under Title VII’s second subpart, it is unlawful for an employer
to do the following:
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.188

These two subparts form the foundation of Title VII’s text.189
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) contains

185. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 95–96 (2003); Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 137 (2000); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 233.
186. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2018).
187. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
188. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
189. As stated earlier, Congress amended Title VII in 1991. However, this does not
change the fact that the foundational text of Title VII is contained in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
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similar main language,190 and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) contains similar concepts, although not always stated in the
same language.191
The text of the federal discrimination statutes does not absolve
an employer of liability when non-supervisors discriminate. Yet, it
is unclear whether Staub requires the factfinder to determine
whether a supervisor intended an outcome because of a protected
trait and the negative outcome resulted from the supervisor’s act.192
One way to read Staub is that it is just expressing one way to prove
a discrimination claim and that its words of limitation
are meaningless.
In other words, even though the Court left open the question of
whether co-workers could be the biased actor, the Court did not
mean to limit the doctrine in this way. Co-workers can start the
sequence of events, as can others who do not have supervisory
power, such as customers. Likewise, the words in Staub that require
the supervisor to intend an adverse action are also not words of
limitation. This is just one way that the plaintiff can prevail, but
there are others. For example, the plaintiff might be able to prevail
if she shows that the biased individual intended one result and
another result happened. And, the plaintiff can prevail if the biased
individual did not intend any particular result but an adverse
outcome resulted.
It is difficult to reconcile any other outcome with the language
of the discrimination statutes. The statutes do not use words like
supervisor, co-worker, or decisionmaker. Instead, they place
liability for discrimination on the employer.193
The statutes do not require that bias exist or that it be exhibited
in any particular way. The statutes do not contain the term
“adverse action.” Although the statutes do allow a protected class
to be taken into account in limited circumstances, they do not allow
employers to escape liability by conducting investigations or
exercising independent judgment, as long as the protected trait
caused the outcome.

190.
191.
192.
193.

29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2018).
42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2018).
Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 422 (2011).
Section 1981 allows for individual liability. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2018).
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The statutes do not contain the words “proximate cause.” Even
if the causal language in the statutes is assumed to contain a
proximate cause analysis, this statutory proximate cause could not
be coterminous with common law proximate cause.194 At the very
least, the courts would be required to defer to the statutory text
itself in determining the limits of liability under the federal
discrimination statutes, and there is a strong argument that
Congress already considered the outward reach of the statutes
when it chose to limit the people protected by the statutes, the
entities liable for discrimination, and exceptions to liability.
A restrictive cat’s paw doctrine is also at odds with the
underlying purposes of the discrimination statutes. The Court has
repeatedly reiterated, “The phrase ‘terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment’ evinces a congressional intent ‘to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women’ in
employment.”195 Courts also frequently note the broad, remedial
purpose of the discrimination statutes.196
It is difficult to reconcile a restrictive cat’s paw doctrine with the
text and purposes of the discrimination statutes, or with numerous
Supreme Court cases. Given the confusion that using the words
“cat’s paw” invites, it is best to abandon the doctrine completely.
Cat’s paw simply is not a different type of liability that requires its
own terms of art and analytical structure.
However, if the Court does not want to abandon cat’s paw, it
can simply indicate that Staub did not limit the factual
circumstances under which a plaintiff can prevail. This choice is
realistic because the Court has done it numerous times. In fact,
employment discrimination jurisprudence is in constant flux
because the Court issues ambiguous legal standards that it then
needs to clarify and re-clarify over time.197
194. See generally Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, supra note 53 (discussing how
Congress often places language limiting liability in statutes and that liability-limiting
language performs a similar function to proximate cause).
195. Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (quoting City of L.A.
Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
196. See, e.g., Butler v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 404, 409 (4th Cir. 2015)
(citing cases).
197. For example, the courts have tried to clarify the McDonnell Douglas test for more
than forty years. The major U.S. Supreme Court cases interpreting McDonnell Douglas in
chronological order are McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976);
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CONCLUSION
The courts should abandon cat’s paw doctrine while it is still in
its infancy. It will be impossible to reconcile a restrictive view of the
doctrine with numerous Supreme Court cases. Indeed, these cases
demonstrate that the courts did not need a separate cat’s paw
doctrine to resolve cases.
More importantly, it is easy to predict that cat’s paw doctrine
will draw the courts into decades of legal battles about what falls
within the doctrine and what does not. Indeed, courts are currently
trying to define who counts as a supervisor, whether supervisory
status is the correct limit, and what a person with bias needs to
intend to potentially create liability. Unfortunately, most of these
questions do not help us answer whether a person faced unequal
treatment because of a protected trait.

Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); Bd. of Trs. of Keene State Coll. v.
Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); USPS
Bd. of Governors v. Aikens (Aikens I), 453 U.S. 902 (1981); USPS Bd. of Governors v. Aikens
(Aikens II), 460 U.S. 711 (1983); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985);
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164 (1989); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); O’Connor v. Consol. Coin
Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308 (1996); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133
(2000); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002); Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540
U.S. 44 (2003); Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454 (2006).

1269

002.SPERINO_NO_HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1270

8/5/20 10:02 PM

2019

